In this paper, we investigate a new basis of the linear space of TU cooperative games. We define a new set of games, which we call as oneleader games, and prove that the set of games is a basis. The new game is related to unanimity game through the dual game and the potential function of the Shapley value. There are two desirable properties of the basis. First, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value. Second, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the Shapley value coincides with the coefficients of some games in the basis. We also show that there is an interesting relationship of the coefficients between a game and its subgame. Based on the relationship, we interpret the coefficients. By using the new basis, we solve the inverse problem of the Shapley value, that is, we characterize the set of all games where the Shapley value is equal to a fixed vector.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate a new basis of the linear space of TU cooperative games. The most famous basis is unanimity games, which was first introduced by Shapley (1953) . In this paper, we define new games which we call as one-leader games. In order to compare the two games, take any coalition and call it as the base coalition. Then, the unanimity game gives 1 to all coalitions which include all players in the base coalition. On the other hand, the one-leader game gives 1 to all coalitions which include only one player in the base coalition. Although the two games capture different situations, there is some relationship. We show that the dual game of the unanimity game and the one-leader game are related through the potential function, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . The relationship enables us to prove that the set of the one-leader games is a basis of the linear space of TU games.
We explain two desirable properties of the new basis. First property is that the one-leader games span the null space of the Shapley value, the set of all games to which the Shapley value assigns 0 vector. Some previous researches have investigated the null space of the Shapley value. For instance, Kleinberg and Weiss (1985) characterized the null space by a direct-sum decomposition of the space. Dragan, Potters and Tijs (1989) focused on the potential function, and found the games which span the null space of the Shapley value. It will be clear that the null space given by our new basis is interpreted more easily.
Second property is that, when we express a game by a linear combination of the new basis, the coefficients have interesting properties. Each coefficient can be calculated by some similar way of the Shapley value. In particular, the Shapley value coincides with the coefficients of games defined when the base coalitions are singletons. By using this property, we characterize the set of games to which the Shapley value assigns a fixed vector. This approach is known as the inverse problem of the Shapley value, and previously investigated by Dragan (2005) and Dragan (2012) .
We also investigate the relationship of the coefficients between a game and its subgame. The relationship gives another proof of Balanced Contribution Property, introduced by Myerson (1980) . Moreover, we show that the Shapley value of any subgame can be calculated by using the coefficients. The interpretation of the coefficients is given as well.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notations and definitions. Section 3 introduces the new basis of the linear space of games. We also discuss the relationship between the new basis and unanimity games. In Section 4, we show three ways to calculate the coefficients and prove the coincidence between the Shapley value and the coefficients. In Section 5, we discuss the relationship of the coefficients between a game and its subgame, and interpret the coefficients. In Section 6, we solve the inverse problem. Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
Notations and definitions
For any two sets A and B, A ⊂ B means that A is a proper subset of B. A ⊆ B means that A ⊂ B or A = B. Let |A| denote the cardinality of A. Let N ⊂ N be a finite set of players, and we call S ⊆ N as a coalition of N . We define |N | = n. A characteristic function v : 2 N → R assigns a real number to each coalition of N , and satisfies v(∅) = 0. We call v(S) as the worth of coalition S. The pair (N, v) is called a TU cooperative game, simply a game, and let Γ denote the set of all games. Moreover let Γ N denote the set of all games with player set N . Γ N can be considered as a linear space by defining addition and scalar multiplication as follows: for any v, w ∈ Γ N and α ∈ R, v + w and αv are defined by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) and (αv)(S) = αv(S) for all S ⊆ N , respectively. Note that Γ N is equivalent to R 2 n −1 , since there are 2 n − 1 non-empty coalitions. For notational convenience, we write v instead of (N, v) if the set of players is clear. For any (N, v) ∈ Γ, let (S, v), S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅ denote the subgame of (N, v), which is a restriction of
The Shapley value, which was first introduced by Shapley (1953) , assigns a n-dimensional payoff vector to each game v ∈ Γ N as follows:
It is known that the Shapley value ϕ is a surjective 1 linear mapping from R 2 n −1 to R n , and the mapping ϕ has the null space, which is given by
The dimension of the null space of ϕ is equal to 2 n − 1 − n. There are two real-valued functions defined on Γ which are useful to calculate the Shapley value. First, the dividend of (N, v) ∈ Γ, introduced by Harsanyi (1959) , is defined as follows:
(1)
The following equation holds. ∑
Second, Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) introduced the potential function on Γ, which is defined recursively. For any (N, v) ∈ Γ,
The following equation holds.
New basis
Let us first remark that we fix the set of players N , n ≥ 2, in this section. We revisit the set of the unanimity games, which were first introduced by Shapley (1953) . The unanimity game u S for some S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅ is defined as follows:
When we express a game v ∈ Γ N by a linear combination of (u S ) ∅̸ =S⊆N , the coefficient of u S is equal to the dividend, D (S, v) .
Consider the dual game of
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the following new game,ū S for S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. We call this game as one-leader game.
Note that the one-leader game is a simple game. Let us interpret and compare the unanimity game and the one-leader game. First, take any coalition S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. We assume that the players in S are leaders in the sense that their participation controls the worth of each coalition. Then, the unanimity game u S captures the situation in which the unanimous agreement of all leaders yields the worth of 1. On the other hand, the one-leader gameū S captures the situation in which one leader can yield the worth of 1. If more than 2 leaders participate, they compete with each other and the worth becomes 0.
The main purpose of this section is to prove that the set of games (ū S ) ∅̸ =S⊆N is a basis of Γ N . Along the way, we show that the one-leader games defined for coalitions with no less than 2 players span the null space of the Shapley value. We first show that the games u d S andū S are related through the potential function.
Lemma 1 Take any
Proof. From equation (4), we need to prove that for any coalition T ⊆ N ,
Consider a coalition {i}, i ∈ N . Then, we haveū
for all i ∈ N , and equation (6) holds. Assume that equation (6) holds for |T | = k − 1, and we prove the case of
where the second equality holds from the induction hypothesis. Case 2 |T ∩ S| = 1.
We define {j} := T ∩ S.
where the third equality holds from the induction hypothesis.
where the second equality again holds from the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 1 implies the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ϕ(ū
Proof. Note that for any game u
for all i. Equation (3) completes the proof.
Since there are 2 n − 1 − n games, these games span the null space of the Shapley value, as long as they are linearly independent.
We prove that the set of games (ū S ) ∅̸ =S⊆N is linearly independent by using matrix algebra. Let Q denote the matrix whose each column vector is equal to u S for some S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. Let Q d denote the matrix whose each column vector is equal to u d S for some S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. LetQ denote the matrix whose each column vector is equal toū S for some S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. It is already known that Q has full rank. We show that Q d andQ also have full rank.
For each matrix, we call the row vector which corresponds to the worth of coalition T , T ⊆ N , T ̸ = ∅ as T -vector.
Lemma 3 Q
d has full rank.
Proof. The matrix Q d can be obtained from Q by the following procedures.
It follows that the matrix Q d has full rank.
Next, we show thatQ has full rank. We give a game which was introduced by Dragan, Potters and Tijs (1989).
As Dragan, Potters and Tijs (1989) showed, the set of games is a basis and when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficient coincides with the value of the potential function of each coalition. We give a lemma which states this property.
Lemma 4 Let (N, v) be a game and suppose that
LetQ denote the matrix whose each column vector is equal toũ S for some S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. Then,Q has full rank. For any v ∈ Γ N , let P (v) denote the column vector whose each coordinate is equal to P (S, v) for some S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. From Lemma 4, the following equation holds for any v ∈ Γ N .
v =QP (v).
LetP denote the matrix whose each column vector is equal to P (ū S ) for
Lemma 5Q has full rank.
By applying equation (7) to each column vectorū S ofQ, we haveQ =QP =QQ d .
Since bothQ and Q d have full rank, the proof is completed.
The discussion up to now is summarized in the next two theorems. Lemma 5 and Theorem 1 are equivalent. Theorem 2 is implied by Lemma 2 and Lemma 5.
Theorem 1 The set of game {ū
S : S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅} is a basis of Γ N .
Theorem 2 The set of games {ū S : S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2} spans the null space of the Shapley value.
Example We give an example of ( 
Calculation of coefficients
From Theorem 1, any game v ∈ Γ N can be expressed by a linear combination
We show three ways to calculate the coefficients. In Theorems 3 and 4, we use the dividend, the potential function, respectively. In Theorem 5, we show the direct calculation of the coefficients from v ∈ Γ N . The point is that the Shpaley value of player i coincides with the coefficient ofū {i} , d N ({i}, v) .
We first prove the theorem which uses the dividend. Before stating the theorem, we give a lemma which was proved by Yokote (2013).
2,3
Lemma 6 (Lemma 2 of Yokote (2013))
Proof. From the assumption, we have
where the second equality holds from Lemma 6. From the uniqueness of
for all S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅. Let us focus on the statement of the theorem. First, let S = N . From equation (8), we have (−1)
and the statement holds. Suppose that the statement holds for all S such that |S| ≥ s + 1 and we show the result for the case of |S| = s, 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1. From equation (8),
where the fourth equality holds from the induction hypothesis. Consider the second term of the right-hand side. 4 We explain the first equality below. In order for
where the third equality holds from the binomial theorem. By substituting this equation into equation (9), and rearranging, we have
which completes the proof.
Next, we prove the theorem which uses the potential function. (N, v) be a game. Then, we have
Theorem 4 Let
In order to prove this theorem, we need additional two lemmas.
Lemma 7 Let (N, v) be a game. Then, we have ∑
T :S⊆Tũ
Proof. Take any S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅ and fix. Let us calculate
If R S, the value is 0.
5 If R ⊇ S, R gains |R| fromũ R (R), but R loses 1 by |R| − |S| times. In summary, we have
which is equal to |S|u S . (N, v) be a game. Then, we have
Lemma 8 Let
Proof. From Lemmas 4 and 7, we have
From the uniqueness of the coefficients, we have
for all S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅. Equivalently,
Let us focus on the statement of Lemma 8. If |S| = 1, the proof is obvious from equation (10) . Suppose that the proof holds for |S| ≤ s − 1, and we prove the case of |S| = s, s ≥ 2. Then, from the induction hypothesis, equation (11) reduces to
) .
By rearranging, we have
Consider the second term of the right-hand side. Take any
. 6 In order for P (T ′ , v) to be added, a coalition
From the binomial theorem, we have
As a result, equation (12) reduces to
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 4. From Theorem 3 and Lemma 8, we have
for all S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅. Let us fix S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅ and consider the righthand side of equation (13) . Take any T ⊆ N, T ̸ = ∅, and we calculate the coefficient of P (T, v). It is given by
In the transformation above, note that (−1) Finally, we show the direct calculation of the coefficients from v ∈ Γ N .
Theorem 5 Let (N, v) be a game. Then, we have
As Owen (1972) showed, the Shapley value can be calculated by using integration. We use the way in the proof.
Proof. Take any v ∈ Γ N and S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅. From Theorem 3 and equation (1), we have
Before we finish this section, we summarize the results. The following figure shows how the values are related. (1) e : Equation (2) f : Equation (10) g : Lemma 8 In the usual setting of TU cooperative games, our main interest is to calculate the Shapley value of some game v ∈ Γ N . The Shapley value, ϕ i (v), is equal to d N ({i}, v), which appears in the circle placed on the top. So, the above figure generalizes the process of the calculation from the Shapley value to the coefficients.
Moreover, we can calculate the worths of coalitions of game v ∈ Γ N given the coefficients d N (S, v) S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. Namely, the inverse arrow of b can be obtained. From equation (5), the gameū T prescribes 1 to coalition S if |S ∩ T | = 1, and prescribes 0 otherwise. As a result,
for all S ⊆ N, S ̸ = ∅. It follows that if the value of one circle is obtained, then all other values can also be obtained.
Coefficients of subgame
In this section, we investigate the relationship of the coefficients between a game and its subgame. Let us first prove a lemma. (N, v) , n ≥ 2, be a game and let j ∈ N . Then, we have
Lemma 9 Let
d N \{j} (S, v) = d N (S, v) + d N (S ∪ {j}, v), for all S ⊆ N \{j}, S ̸ = ∅. Proof. Take any S ⊆ N \{j}, S ̸ = ∅. From Theorem 3, we have d N (S, v) = (−1) |S|−1 ∑ T ⊆N :S⊆T 1 |T | D(T, v) = (−1) |S|−1 ∑ T ⊆N \{j}:S⊆T 1 |T | D(T, v) + (−1) |S|−1 ∑ T ⊆N :S∪{j}⊆T 1 |T | D(T, v), d N (S ∪ {j}, v) = (−1) |S| ∑ T ⊆N :S∪{j}⊆T 1
|T | D(T, v).
Since (−1)
we must have
The following lemma is an extension of Lemma 9. (N, v) , n ≥ 2, be a game and let Proof. From Lemma 9, the statement holds if |T | = 1. Suppose that the statement holds for all T such that |T | = k − 1, and we prove the case of |T | = k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Take any S ⊆ N \T, S ̸ = ∅, and any j ∈ T . From Lemma 9, we have
Lemma 10 Let
where the second equality holds from the induction hypothesis, which completes the proof.
We give the main theorem of this section. The theorem says that we can calculate the Shapley value of any subgame by using the coefficients. We skip the proof since it is obvious from Lemma 10 and the fact that the Shapley value coincides with the coefficient.
Theorem 6 Let (N, v) be a game and let T ⊆ N, T ̸ = ∅. Then, we have
We interpret the results of this section. First, we show that Lemma 9 induces Balanced Contribution Property, introduced by Myerson (1980) . To see this, take any i, j ∈ N , i ̸ = j. From Lemma 9, we have
By applying the fact that the Shapley value coincides with the coefficient, we have
It follows that
which is equivalent to the statement of Balanced Contribution Property. , v) is the surplus obtained by the cooperation of j ∈ N . The point is that the surplus is equal to −d N ({i, j}, v) , and the value appears in the coefficient. We now extend the interpretation by using Theorem 6. Let (N, v) , n ≥ 2, be a game and take any coalition S ⊂ N, S ̸ = ∅, and any player i ∈ S. Consider the situation in which players in S are bargaining over the division of v(S). If the Shapley value is employed as a division rule, then the payoff of i is equal to ϕ i (S, v) . Now assume that the players in N \S merge into the bargaining. For player i, the difference of the payoff, ϕ i (N, v) − ϕ i (S, v) , is the surplus obtained by the cooperation of N \S. From Theorem 6, the difference can be rewritten as follows: 
Inverse problem
In this section, we focus on the inverse problem of the Shapley value. For a n-dimensional vector x, we characterize the set of games where the Shapley value is exactly equal to x. By solving this problem, we can clarify the set of games where the Shapley value prescribes a same payoff vector. The answer also tells us the invariance of the Shapley value against the change of the structure of games.
From Theorem 2 and linearity of ϕ, the change in the coefficients ofū S , |S| ≥ 2, namely the change in d N (S, v), |S| ≥ 2, has nothing to do with the Shapley value. In other words, we can change the value of d N (S, v), |S| ≥ 2, without changing the Shapley value. This viewpoint is the key in the proof of the next theorem. 
The equation in the statement holds from the definition of (ū T ) ∅̸ =T ⊆N . If part. The game v is given by
Since ϕ is linear,
From Lemma 2, ϕ(ū T ) = 0 for all T ⊆ N , |T | ≥ 2. For any i ∈ N , we have ϕ i (u {i} ) = 1 and ϕ j (u {i} ) = 0 for all j ∈ N \{i}. 10 It follows that
which complete the proof.
We prove a corollary in which we deal with the games where the worths of all coalitions with less than n − 1 players are 0. In the class of games, the dimension of the set of games with the same Shapley value reduces to 1.
In the proof, we use the following recursive formula of the Shapley value.
The formula was investigated by Maschler and Owen (1989) , or Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) .
Proof. Only if part. Take any player i, j ∈ N , i ̸ = j. From equation (14), we have
Similarly,
From equations (16) and (17),
where the first equality holds from Theorem 7 and the third equality holds from equation (14) . From equation (15),
Substituting into equation (18) yields
Since j was an arbitrary player, we must have y j = y k for all j, k ∈ N \{i}. By letting y denote the equal value, we have
By replacing i with another player, we can get the same equation with the equal value y. If part. Since the addition of y to all coalitions with the same size n − 1 has nothing to do with the Shapley value, we ignore y. For any i ∈ N , equation (15) implies
From Corollary 1, we can know the interesting structure of the games in the statement. For each player i ∈ N , the coalition N \{i} first obtains the sum of amounts which the players in N \{i} receive in x. Then, N \{i} loses the amount which player i receives in x times n − 2. Finally, the value y is added to all coalitions with n − 1 players.
Concluding remarks
We can apply axiomatic approach to the new basis. The prescribed vector to each one-leader game can be uniquely determined by using the following basic axioms: efficiency, equal treatment property and null player property. For anyū S ∈ Γ N , S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2, from null player property, we have ϕ k (ū S ) = 0, for all k ∈ N \S, which implies ∑ i∈S ϕ i (ū S ) = 0 sinceū S (N ) = 0. From equal treatment property, ϕ i (ū S ) = ϕ j (ū S ) = 0, for all i, j ∈ S, and we have ϕ(ū S ) = 0. For anyū {i} ∈ Γ N , i ∈ N , from null player property and efficiency, we have ϕ j (ū {i} ) = 0, for all j ∈ N \{i} and ϕ i (ū {i} ) = 1. By using linearity in addition to the three axioms, we can prove the coincidence between the Shapley value and the coefficients. The unanimity games have widely been used in the proof of axiomatization of the Shapley value, especially in the case that the number of players is fixed throughout the proof. Van den Brink (2001) charactrizes the Shapley value by using a fairness property. If we use the one-leader games instead of the unanimity games in the proof, the proof becomes simpler.
By slightly changing the definition of the new basis, we can deal with the variations of the Shapley value. We first consider the weighted Shapley value. For any ω ∈ R n ++ , we define the weighted Shapley value with positive weight ω on Γ N as follows:
For any ω ∈ R n ++ , letū We give a theorem proved by Yokote (2013) .
